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Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie:  
Maryland’s Precarious Balance Between Internet 
Defamation and the Right to eAnonymity 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,1 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland established the standard for Maryland courts to apply when 
balancing an individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on 
the Internet against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for 
defamation.2 In this case of first impression, the court developed a five part 
test (the “Brodie Test”) consisting of: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to respond; 
(3) identifying the exact statements alleged to be defamatory; (4) prima 
facie proof of the allegations; and (5) a balancing test.3  In attempting to 
guide the lower courts, the first four elements of the Brodie court’s test 
provide much direction.4 The inclusion of a balancing component, however, 
causes the Brodie Test to fall short of its goal of establishing a clear 
standard for the lower courts to apply because the balancing component 
subjects the outcome of cases to a great deal of judicial discretion.5 The 
Brodie Test blurs the line between defamation and legitimate discourse and 
will hinder the development of the Internet and keep it from reaching its 
potential as a truly credible public forum.6  
 
 
© 2011 Bryce Donohue. 
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 1. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009). 
 2. Id. at 457. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See infra Parts IV.A–B. 
 5. See infra Part IV.C. 
 6. See infra Part IV.C. 
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II. The Case 
A. Factual Background 
The controversy in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie7 revolved 
around statements made by anonymous Internet forum participants who 
posted comments to a website operated by the appellee, Independent 
Newspapers, Inc. (“Independent Newspapers”).8 The anonymous Internet 
forum participants were known only by their screen-names:9 
“CorsicaRiver,” “Born & Raised Here”10 and “chatdusoleil,” (collectively: 
“John Doe Defendants”).11 The three John Doe Defendants posted 
comments to a message board in response to two separate articles published 
by Independent Newspapers about appellant Zebulon J. Brodie.12  
The first discussion thread (the “Centreville Eyesore”), dated March 
14, 2006, contained comments chastising a developer for burning down Mr. 
Brodie’s former home in Centreville, Maryland.13 The second discussion 
 
 7. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009). 
 8. Id. at 442.  
 9. Encyclopedia, PC MAGAZINE, Aug. 26, 2010 (Screen names are defined as pseudonyms 
that individuals use when interacting on the Internet.), available at, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=username&i=53570,00.asp.  
 10. The screen name cited by the court is “Born & amp; Raised Here” The reason for the 
“amp;” is because that is how the screen name appears in html code. I have removed the html code 
to avoid confusion. See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 442. 
 11. Id. Independent Newspapers is a media corporation which operates the website 
www.newszap.com, a news website that allows users to post comments on various news stories 
posted on the site. Id. at n.11. 
 12. Id. at 443–47. 
 13. Id. at 443–44.  
CorsicaRiver: I think there must be a special circle in Hell reserved for a greedy selfish 
developer who deliberately burns down a beautiful pre-Civil War house, after cutting 
down all the 100-year-old [C]ypress trees around it. A really hot circle of Hell, where 
they do nasty things to you with nail guns and hot asphalt. 
  What I'm referring to is not in Centreville, but nearby in Church Hill . . . . The white 
Greek Revival house facing 213 that Zeb Brodie sold 3 months ago for $1.85 mil to 
developers, who deliberately torched it this past weekend. As of this morning, they 
were bulldozing the charred remnants. There goes another one of our County's historic 
landmarks, a sight that used to lift my spirits every time I past [sic] it on 213. 
  Shame on you Mr. Brodie! 
Born & Raised Here: Oh my God, they burned the place down? I can't believe it!!!!!! I 
heard Bill Sharp bought it from Brodie, don't know if that's true or not. Has anyone else 
heard the same thing? 
CorsicaRiver: Yes, they burned it down . . . and shame on Bill Sharp as well as Mr. 
Brodie! 
  I just found out some more information about the house. It was known as the Charles 
Cahall Farm and apparently dated back to the 1850s. In his 1980 historical sites survey, 
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thread (“Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts”), dated March 17–21, 2006, contained 
comments relating to unsanitary conditions in a Dunkin Donuts which Mr. 
Brodie owned and operated.14 The evidence provided by Mr. Brodie 
reflects that the parties responsible for the defamatory statements in the 
Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts discussion thread posted under the screen-names 
“RockyRaccoonMD” and “Suze” (collectively the “Unnamed 
Offenders”).15 Neither of the Unnamed Offenders was named in the 
complaint.16 
B. Procedural History 
On May 26, 2006, Zebulon Brodie filed a two-count complaint in the 
Circuit Court for Queen Ann’s County, Maryland, in which he alleged 
defamation and conspiracy to defame against Independent Newspapers, Inc. 
and the three John Doe Defendants.17 Independent Newspapers argued that 
it was immune from liability under the Federal Communications and 
Decency Act18 and filed a “Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment.”19  In support of its motion, Independent Newspapers 
argued that the comments in the “Centreville Eyesore” discussion thread 
made by the three John Doe Defendants were “non-actionable opinion” 
because the comments implicated the developer to whom Mr. Brodie sold 
 
Orlando Ridout of the Maryland Historic Trust called it “one of the most carefully, 
preserved farmhouses in the country,” “remarkable,” and “virtually untouched.” There 
were also a well-preserved meat house, windmill, and granary. 
 *** 
chatdusoleil: Has there been a news story on the fire this weekend? Or an 
investigation? 
Id. 
 14. Id. at 446.  
Suze: . . . I haven’t seen the inside of a DD in a while, but have you seen the outside? I 
drove . . .  through not long ago and was completely and utterly SHOCKED at the 
amount of trash . . . . It’s apparent no one is cleaning the outside of the [sic] building . . 
. . If they don’t keep the outside clean . . . hmm . . . makes you wonder. 
RockyRacoonMD: I wouldn’t go to that Dunkin’ Donuts of Brodie’s anyway . . . taken 
a close look at it lately? One of the most dirty and . . . looking food-service places I 
have seen . . . I bought coffee . . . couple of times but quickly lost my appetite . . . . 
Id. 
 15. Id. at 446–47. 
 16. Id. at 442. 
 17. Id. (The John Does named in the Complaint are identified only by their usernames: 
“Corsica River,” “Born & amp; Raised Here” and “chatdusoleil.”). Id. 
 18. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006). 
 19. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 443. 
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his home and were not “of and concerning Brodie.”20 Before a ruling was 
made on its initial motion, Independent Newspapers filed a second “Motion 
for a Protective Order” to shield it from being compelled to identify the 
three John Doe Defendants.21 
In an order dated November 21, 2006,22 the circuit court dismissed 
Independent Newspapers from the case, ruling that because Independent 
Newspapers was an “interactive computer service,”23 and the John Doe 
Defendants were “information content provider[s],”24 under the Federal 
Communications and Decency Act,25 Independent Newspapers could not be 
sued as the publisher of the statements.26 The same order, however, 
compelled the identification of the three John Doe Defendants.27 
Independent Newspapers immediately petitioned the court to reconsider the 
order compelling identification of the three John Doe Defendants and in 
support argued that the court had improperly assumed that the statements 
posted by the three John Doe Defendants were actionable, without requiring 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 444–45. 
 22. Id. at 445. 
 23. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any 
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides 
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational 
institutions.”).  
 24. See id. at § 230 (f)(3) (“The term ‘information content provider’ means any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information 
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”). 
 25. See id. at § 230. The Federal Communications and Decency Act was enacted to promote 
the five-part policy of the United States for communications on the Internet.  
It is the policy of the United States (1) to promote the continued development of the 
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media; (2) to 
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet 
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to 
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and 
other interactive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict 
their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to 
ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in 
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer. 
 Id. 
 26. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 445 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information 
provided by another information content provider.”)).  
 27. Id.  
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any showing that Brodie had a valid cause of action.28 Upon 
reconsideration, the circuit court dismissed the cause of action arising out of 
the statements in the Centreville Eyesore discussion thread, but enforced the 
subpoena relating to the claim arising out of the statements in the 
Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts discussion thread.29 Accordingly, on March 12, 
2007, the circuit court ordered the identification of the forum participants 
who made the allegedly defamatory remarks in the Unsanitary Dunkin 
Donuts discussion thread.30  
In an attempt to comply with the March 12, 2007 order, Independent 
Newspapers requested the specific allegations of defamation relating to the 
Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts discussion thread from plaintiff’s counsel.31 
Plaintiff’s counsel identified the allegedly defamatory comments and the 
John Does’ screen names in a letter that read in part: “It seems, from my 
reading of the enclosure, that the identifiable ‘posters’ are RockyRacoonMD 
and Suze.”32 Shortly after sending this letter, plaintiff’s counsel served 
another subpoena on Independent Newspapers ordering discovery of “any 
and all documents and tangible things identifying and/or relating to [the 
three John Doe Defendants], ‘RockyRacoonMD’ and ‘Suze.’”33 Despite 
Independent Newspapers’ motion to quash and/or for a protective order, 
and Independent Newspapers’ argument that Brodie had failed to assert an 
actionable claim of defamation, the court denied Independent Newspapers’ 
motion and ordered Independent Newspapers to comply with the subpoena 
and identify all five anonymous forum participants.34  
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to any 
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals to decide whether the court 
properly denied Independent Newspapers’ motion to quash and/or for a 
protective order, and to discuss what standard to employ when balancing an 
individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on the Internet 
against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for defamation.35 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 445–46. 
 30. Id. (“ORDERED, that the requested protective order is denied as to statements regarding 
Plaintiff’s businesses to the extent providing available discovery regarding the identity of those 
individuals who made statements that the Plaintiff’s food service business was maintained in a 
‘dirty and unsanitary-looking’ manner, and was permitting trash from the business to pollute the 
nearby waterway.”). See supra notes 13 and 14 for a description of the two discussion threads. 
 31. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 446. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 447. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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III. Legal Background 
Freedom of speech, as protected by the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution,36 is one of the cornerstones of American democracy.37 
Though not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, an individual’s right 
to anonymity is implied by courts to be within the protections of the First 
Amendment.38 These protections apply to state and local governments 
through the Fourteenth Amendment,39 and have been interpreted to extend 
equally to communications on the Internet.40 The protections of the First 
Amendment, however, are not absolute41 and may be curtailed to protect 
other interests.42 For example, the First Amendment does not protect 
defamatory statements.43 Accordingly, an individual’s First Amendment 
right to anonymity on the Internet may be superseded by a plaintiff’s right 
to protect their reputation in cases of defamation.44 Recognizing these 
 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech 
. . . .”). 
 37. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). See also THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD 
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (Random House 1966); Stephen R. 
McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575, 577 (2007). 
 38. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
165–66 (2002) (finding that requiring an anonymous speaker to reveal her identity is offensive to 
the values protected by the First Amendment); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 
334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning 
omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 39. Eanes v. State, 569 A.2d 604, 608 (Md. 1990) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
(1925)).  
 40. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (applying the same First Amendment 
protections to the Internet as are applied to other mediums); see also Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, 
140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (2001) (reasoning that stripping Internet users their anonymity would 
have a “significant chilling effect on Internet communications and thus on basic First Amendment 
Rights”). 
 41. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well 
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”); 
see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances [are] not . . . 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech . . . ”). 
 42. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (finding that defamatory and libelous speech are not 
protected by the First Amendment because they do not constitute any “essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (finding that as a 
general principle, the First Amendment does not protect defamatory statements).  
 44. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 460 (Del. 2005) (holding that before a defamation 
plaintiff can obtain the identity of an anonymous defendant through the compulsory discovery 
process he must support his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment 
motion). 
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competing interests, many courts have sought to balance these interests with 
easily discernable tests.45 To date, there is no consensus on how courts 
should balance these competing interests,46 but four principles have guided 
courts in determining the appropriate test for their jurisdiction: (1) the 
essential feature that has enabled the Internet to become such a pervasive 
forum for public discourse is the ability for individuals to interact 
anonymously;47 (2) because of the nature of the Internet, judicial 
intervention is not always required for a plaintiff to obtain a remedy;48 (3) 
the ease of identifying anonymous Internet forum participants opens the 
door to potential abuses of the legal process;49 (4) the court must balance 
the interest in a free-flowing exchange of ideas on the Internet with the 
interest of preventing abuses of the protection that anonymity provides.50  
This section will first offer a brief overview of the law of defamation, 
including the elements of the cause of action and how the cause of action is 
proved.51 Next, this section will discuss some of the features of the Internet 
that distinguish Internet defamation cases from traditional defamation 
cases.52 To that end, Part B of this section will analyze the importance of 
the Internet as a public forum,53 how the Internet provides unique extra-
judicial remedies to some individuals,54 and how the technology behind the 
Internet alters the normal defamation analysis.55 Finally, this section will 
give an overview of three different standards employed by various state 
 
 45. See infra, Part III.C. 
 46. Compare Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460 (applying a summary judgment standard), with In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) 
(applying a “good faith” test). 
 47. See Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“The 
free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to 
communicate anonymously.”). 
 48. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A2d 756, 760 (requiring that the plaintiff notify the 
anonymous individual by posting a message of notification on the same message board from 
which the claim arose). 
 49. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (Warning of a “sue first, ask questions later” approach, that 
coupled with a standard only minimally protective of the anonymity of defendants, will 
discourage debate on important issues of public concern as more and more anonymous posters 
censor their online statements in response to the likelihood of being unmasked). 
 50. See infra Part III.C. 
 51. See infra Part III.A. 
 52. See infra Part III.B. 
 53. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 54. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 55. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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courts when attempting to balance the First Amendment right to anonymity 
with an individual’s right to protect their reputation.56  
A. Defamation: An Overview   
The First Amendment right to anonymity does not apply in cases of 
defamation.57  In order for a statement to be considered defamation under 
Maryland law, the plaintiff must show: “(1) that the defendant made a 
defamatory statement to a third person, (2) that the statement was false, (3) 
that the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement, and (4) that 
the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.”58 Maryland defines a defamatory 
statement as a statement of fact that “tends to expose a person to public 
scorn, hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby discouraging others in the 
community from having a good opinion of, or associating with, that 
person.”59 The plaintiff must establish each of the four elements of a 
defamation claim by clear and convincing evidence, and must establish that 
the defendant acted at least negligently when making the statement.60 If a 
court finds that a defendant’s statement is defamatory, and the other three 
elements of defamation are established, then it will refuse to extend the 
protections of the First Amendment to that statement and the defendant is 
exposed to liability.61  For example, in Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf,62 a 
plaintiff sued his former employer for false statements that his former 
employer made to a new employer, which prevented the plaintiff from 
obtaining a job with the new employer.63 The Maryland Court of Appeals 
found the former employer guilty of defamation where he published a false 
 
 56. See infra Part III.C. 
 57. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (finding that as a general 
principle, the First Amendment does not protect defamatory statements). See also Chaplinsky v. 
State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 72, 74 (1942) (finding that when appellee said the 
words “[y]ou are a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist and the whole government of 
Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,” his speech was no longer protected by the First 
Amendment because such words are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”). 
 58. Offen v. Brenner, 935 A.2d 719, 723–24 (Md. 2007); see also Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. 
Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 697–98 (Md. 1976) (finding that a plaintiff must prove these elements to a 
negligence standard). 
 59. Offen, 935 A.2d at 724 (quoting Gohari v. Darvish, 767 A.2d 321, 327 (2001)).  
 60. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 249 (Md. 1997) 
 61. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (finding that defamatory speech is not protected 
by the First Amendment). See also, Nolan v. Campbell, 690 N.W. 2d 638, 652 (Neb. Ct. App. 
2004) (finding that libelous speech is not protected under the First Amendment). 
 62. 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976). 
 63. Id. 
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defamatory statement concerning a private person, and he knew, recklessly 
disregarded, or negligently failed to ascertain, that the statement was false 
and defamed the other plaintiff.64 
B.  The Internet is a Unique Forum to which the Rules of Traditional 
Defamation Claims May Not Apply  
The Internet is a unique forum for social interaction for many reasons and 
this uniqueness may change the way that defamation laws are applied.65 
First, there are unique aspects of the Internet that give it enormous potential 
as a forum of public discourse.66 Second, the Internet provides an extra-
judicial remedy available to potential plaintiffs who are defamed on the 
Internet that is not available to potential plaintiffs who are defamed in other 
mediums.67 Finally, the same technology that makes the Internet a unique 
forum for public discourse opens the door to potential abuses of the legal 
process.68 
1.  Courts Recognize the Internet’s Potential as a Forum for Public 
Discourse 
The emergence of the Internet has changed the landscape of free speech by 
giving people “a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox.”69  And with the Internet’s ubiquitous nature and prominence in 
today’s culture, it has all but replaced the more traditional forums for 
debate.70 When presented with cases involving free speech and the Internet, 
courts point out the vital role that the Internet plays in the ongoing dialogue 
of human thought.71 While courts recognize that the Internet would not be 
as successful as it is at facilitating public discourse if it did not allow people 
 
 64. Id. at 697–98. 
 65. See infra. Part III.B. 
 66. See infra. Part III.B.1. 
 67. See infra. Part III.B.2. 
 68. See infra. Part III.B.3. 
 69. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (discussing whether the Communications 
Decency Act violates the First Amendment as overbroad).  
 70. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (discussing the reach of the Internet: “A 
person in Alaska can have a conversation with a person in Japan about beekeeping in Bangladesh, 
just as easily as several Smyrna residents can have a conversation about Smyrna politics.”). 
 71. See In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (“Internet anonymity 
serves a particularly vital role in the exchange of ideas and robust debate on matters of public 
concern.”). See also, Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001) 
(“The ‘ability to speak one’s mind’ on the Internet ‘without the burden of the other party knowing 
all the facts about one’s identity can foster open communication and robust debate.’”) (quoting 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D.Cal. 1999)). 
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to interact anonymously,72 courts are also aware that the informal nature of 
the Internet and the ability for anyone to participate in the debate, 
sometimes causes the discourse to digress into “cyber-smear.”73 The 
California Court of Appeals noted that on the Internet:  
 
[U]sers are able to engage freely in informal debate and 
criticism, leading many to substitute gossip for accurate 
reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even combative 
tone. . . . [O]nline discussions may look more like a vehicle for 
emotional catharsis than a forum for the rapid exchange of 
information and ideas.74 
 
Even with the benefits that anonymity brings to public discourse on 
the Internet, courts recognize that there are situations where anonymity is 
abused, and therefore, not extended.75 Specifically, courts recognize that 
the anonymity that the Internet offers opens the door to libel and other 
tortuous conduct.76 Courts also recognize that the effects of such tortuous 
conduct spread much faster and farther because of the nature of the 
Internet.77 In Krinsky v. Doe 6,78 for example, the California Court of 
Appeals found that “[t]he fact that many Internet speakers employ online 
pseudonyms tends to heighten [the] sense that ‘anything goes,’ and some 
commentators have likened cyberspace to a frontier society free from the 
conventions and constraints that limit discourse in the real world.”79 
 
 72. See 2THEMART.COM, 140 F. Supp.  2d at 1093 (“The free exchange of ideas on the 
Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously.”). 
 73. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72  Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how the 
casual nature of the Internet often leads conversation in Internet forums to look more like vehicles 
for emotional catharsis than forums for a rapid exchange of intelligent ideas).  
 74. Id. (citing Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in 
Cyberspace 49 DUKE L. J. 855, 863 (2000)). 
 75. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (finding that the First 
Amendment does not protect lewd, obscene, profane, or libelous speech); see also Krinsky, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238 (finding that anonymity on the Internet tends to lead to a discourse that is, for 
better or worse, free from the tradition societal constraints and covenants). 
 76. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 231. 
 79. Id. at 238. (quoting Lidsky, supra note 74, at 863. In Krinsky, a corporate president 
brought suit against ten anonymous defendants for allegedly defamatory statements posted on 
Internet sites under pseudonyms. Id. at 235. In connection with the suit, plaintiff served a 
subpoena on a California ISP to discover the true identity of each of the ten John Doe Defendants. 
Id. John Doe number 6 moved to quash the subpoena. Id. The trial court denied Defendant’s 
motion, but the California appellate court reversed. Id. at 236, 251 
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2. The Nature of the Internet Provides Plaintiffs with a Remedy that is 
Independent of the Court System 
The Internet allows people to anonymously communicate with a large 
audience instantly through various forums and message boards.80 While this 
ease of communication can foster great debate, it may also lead to abuses 
and conversations that resemble little more than verbal mud-slinging.81 
When the conversation turns sour and people post defamatory statements on 
the Internet, the Internet allows people to instantly respond to those 
defamatory statements and take away some of the negative impact of those 
statements.82 By giving people the ability to respond directly to a 
defamatory statement, the Internet provides people with a remedy that is 
independent of the court system.83  
Courts encourage potential plaintiffs to take advantage of the unique 
features of the Internet and use remedies that keep potential litigants out of 
the courtroom.84 A majority of the states that have developed tests to 
determine whether or not to enforce a subpoena ordering the discovery of 
the identity of an anonymous Internet forum participant accused of 
defamation require plaintiffs to attempt to notify the defendant of their 
intention to discover his identity.85 Many of these same courts encourage 
the plaintiff to notify the defendant on the same Internet forum where the 
defamation occurred.86  
Courts that require notification argue that by giving notice, potential 
plaintiffs may be able to resolve disputes before they have to bring suit.87 In 
Doe v. Cahill,88 for example, the Supreme Court of Delaware found that the 
 
 80. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (discussing the reach of the Internet: “A 
person in Alaska can have a conversation with a person in Japan about beekeeping in Bangladesh, 
just as easily as several Smyrna residents can have a conversation about Smyrna politics.”). 
 81. See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238 (discussing how the casual nature of the Internet 
often leads conversation in Internet forums to look more like vehicles for emotional catharsis than 
forums for a rapid exchange of intelligent ideas). 
 82. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(requiring that the plaintiff notify the anonymous individual by posting a message of notification 
on the same message board from which the claim arose). 
 83. Id. 
 84. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (requiring that 
the plaintiff undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a 
subpoena or application for an order of the disclosure). 
 85. Id.; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. 
 86. See, e.g., Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 (requiring that the plaintiff notify the anonymous 
individual by posting a message of notification on the same message board from which the claim 
arose). 
 87. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464. 
 88. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
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unique nature of the Internet allows a potential defendant the opportunity to 
mitigate, and even eliminate, the damage caused by a defamatory statement 
without involving the court system.89 The Cahill court found that:  
 
[a] person wronged by statements of an anonymous poster can 
respond instantly. . . to the allegedly defamatory statements on 
the same site or blog, and thus, can, almost contemporaneously, 
respond to the same audience that initially read the allegedly 
defamatory statements. The plaintiff can thereby easily correct 
any misstatements or falsehoods, respond to character attacks, 
and generally set the record straight.90 
 
Courts that require notification find that attempting notice is neither 
burdensome nor inequitable, and hold that unless notice is attempted, a 
subpoena ordering the discovery of an anonymous Internet forum 
participant will not be enforced.91  
Courts that do not require notification point to the difficulty a plaintiff 
may encounter in notifying defendant.92 But even those courts require a 
showing of the steps taken to locate the defendant.93 For example, in 
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,94 the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California considered the defendant’s right to 
anonymity in relation to the plaintiff’s right to recover damages stemming 
from a trademark infringement claim.95 Although Seescandy.com did not 
 
 89. Id. at 464. 
 90. Id.  
 91. See, e.g., Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (requiring 
attempted notification and finding it not unduly burdensome). 
 92. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“Parties who have been injured . . . are likely to find themselves chasing the tortfeasor from 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually discovering the identity of 
the tortfeasor.”); see generally In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 
1210372 (2000) (making no mention of a requirement of notice in its analysis). 
 93. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579 (requiring that the party seeking relief identify all 
previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant). 
 94. Id. at 573. 
 95. Id. In Seescandy.com, the plaintiff was the assignee of various trademark related to the 
operation of “See’s Candy Shops, Inc.” and sought an injunction against the defendant who had 
registered the Internet domain name “seescandy.com.” Id. at 575. The essence of plaintiff’s claim 
was that by registering the domain name “seescandy.com,” defendant had infringed on plaintiff’s 
trademark. Id. The case, however, got stuck in a mire of pre-trial motions because defendant had 
registered the domain name under a pseudonym and plaintiff was unable to ascertain the true 
identity of the defendant. Id. Plaintiff then moved the court to grant the discovery of defendant’s 
true identity so that plaintiff could serve process. Id. at 577. 
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implicate the defendant’s First Amendment rights, the California court 
recognized the unique circumstances created by the advent of the Internet 
and established a test for California to use when deciding issues relating to 
the exposure of the identity of once anonymous defendants.96 The court 
found that the plaintiff need not actually serve the defendant before 
discovering the defendant’s business records, but the plaintiff must identify 
all steps previously taken to locate the defendant.97 In so finding, the court 
reasoned that by requiring the plaintiff to identify the steps taken to notify 
the defendant, the court is ensuring that the plaintiff is issuing his subpoena 
in good faith.98 
3. The Technology of the Internet Enables Potential Plaintiffs to Identify 
Potential Defendants with Relative Ease and Opens the Door to Potential 
Abuses of the Legal Process 
While the technology behind the Internet enables people to anonymously 
interact on a global scale, the same technology enables anyone to discover 
the true identity of people interacting on the Internet.99 One way to identify 
an anonymous individual interacting on the Internet is through Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) Tracing.100 The Delaware Supreme Court explained the 
mechanics of IP Tracing in its decision in Cahill.101 When an individual 
connects to the Internet, his computer is assigned a unique number called an 
IP Address.102 IP Addresses are essential to the functioning of the Internet 
because they allow computers to communicate with each other and tell 
servers where to send information.103 For example, when a person visits a 
website, his computer sends code to back and forth to another computer, the 
two computers would not be able to communicate with each other without 
knowing where they were sending the code.104 Most IP addresses are 
owned, not by the individual accessing the Internet, but by the company 
providing the access the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).105 The ISP 
 
 96. Id. at 578–79. 
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. at 579. 
 99. See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.  
 100. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Del. 2005). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 454. 
 103. See What is an IP Address? KIOSKEA.NET  http://en kioskea net/contents/Internet/ip.php3 
(last visited Jan. 13, 2011). See also 3COM, Understanding IP Addressing: Everything You Ever 
Wanted to Know, 2–7. (2001). 
 104. 3com, Understanding IP Addressing: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know, 2–7 (2001).  
 105. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454. 
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assigns a unique IP address to each individual computer for the period of 
time that that computer is accessing the Internet.106  
If a plaintiff wants to discover the true identity of a person who 
defamed him, the plaintiff starts with the website on which the defamatory 
information was posted.107 The host of the website will have a list of IP 
addresses that posted content to (and even that accessed) their website.108 
From that list of IP addresses, the plaintiff will be able to identify the IP 
address of the person who defamed him.109 A simple Google search of the 
IP address will reveal that person’s ISP.110 If the ISP knows the time and 
date of the defamatory postings were made from a specific IP address, it can 
determine the identity of its subscriber.111  
As the technology that enables discovery of true identities has become 
more readily accessible, courts have imposed higher burdens on plaintiffs 
seeking such discovery.112  None of the technology described above existed 
at the time of Talley v. California,113 or when Alexander Hamilton 
published the Federalist Papers under his famous pseudonym “Publius.”114 
Previous defamation cases involved statements published in print media 
which, once published, were difficult to trace back to their author.115 In 
Talley, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that prohibited 
circulation of handbills that did not include the names and addresses of the 
people who sponsored them.116 In so holding, the Court emphasized the 
importance that anonymity has played in history, 117  and the lengths that 
 
 106. Id. at 454–55. 
 107. Id. at 454. 
 108. Id. at 455. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Anyone can obtain the IP address for their computer by visiting 
http://whatismyipaddress.com/. This website will reveal not only an individual’s IP address, but 
their ISP.  
 111. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455. 
 112. Compare In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) (applying a “good faith” test), with Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460 (applying a 
summary judgment standard). 
 113. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 114. The Federalist Papers were published anonymously under the name “Publius.” See 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6 (1995). 
 115. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960). 
 116. Id. at 65. 
 117. Id. at 64.  
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important 
role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time 
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either 
anonymously or not at all. The obnoxious press licensing law of England, which was 
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corrupt authorities would go to discover the identity of anonymous 
publishers of controversial leaflets.118  
The Internet has changed the landscape of anonymous speech 
jurisprudence because identification of defamatory Internet users is easier 
than the identification of an anonymous publisher of a flyer.119 With the 
ease of identification, courts recognize the potential for abuses.120 The 
Delaware Supreme Court recognized in Cahill that once anonymity is 
destroyed, it can never be restored.121 The Cahill court’s decision was 
guided by the concern that the revelation of the identity of an anonymous 
speaker “may subject [that speaker] to ostracism for expressing unpopular 
ideas, [or] invite retaliation from those who oppose her ideas. . . .”122 These 
types of extra-judicial remedies give courts pause when evaluating whether 
to permit discovery.123 The New Jersey Superior Court emphasized the 
danger of allowing someone to easily discover the identity of an anonymous 
person when it noted that “[p]eople who have committed no wrong should 
be able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass 
or embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of 
the court’s order to discover their identity.”124 
 
also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the 
names of printers, writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature 
critical of the government.  
Id. 
 118. Id. at 64–65 
 The old seditious libel cases in England show the lengths to which government had to 
go to find out who was responsible for books that were obnoxious to the rulers. John 
Lilburne was whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to 
get evidence to convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in 
England. Two Puritan Ministers, John Penry and John Udal, were sentenced to death on 
charges that they were responsible for writing, printing or publishing books. Before the 
Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or 
distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by 
English-controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were written and 
the identity of their author is unknown to this day. Even the Federalist Papers, written 
in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is 
plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes. 
Id. 
 119. Compare Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65, with Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 767 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 120. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005). 
 121. Id. at 457. 
 122. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Dendrite Int’l, 775 A.2d at 767 (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 
573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
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C. Courts Have not Agreed to a Uniform Burden of Proof for Discovering 
the Identity of an Anonymous Internet Forum Participant 
There is no uniform burden of proof that courts require before they will 
enforce a subpoena to discover the identity of an anonymous Internet forum 
participant.125 In cases where a court is presented with competing interests 
of the First Amendment right to anonymity and protection against 
defamation, burdens of proof range from a very low good faith basis 
standard,126 to a moderate motion to dismiss standard,127 to a demanding 
prima facie / summary judgment standard.128  
1.  Good Faith Basis Standard 
States that apply the good-faith basis standard require that a plaintiff only 
show “that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith 
basis to contend that [he] may be the victim of conduct actionable in the 
jurisdiction where suit was filed.”129 In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
America Online, Inc., [hereinafter “AOL”],130 the Virginia Circuit Court 
adopted a three-part test and held that a court should only order a non-party, 
ISP to provide information concerning the identity of a subscriber when: 
    
 
 125. See generally, Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent 
Legal Standard, 118 YALE L. J. 320 (2008) (discussing the various burdens that courts impose 
when considering a subpoena to discover the identity of an anonymous Internet forum 
participant). 
 126. Virginia and Washington require that a plaintiff show a good faith reason for requesting 
the true identity of an Internet user that he accuses of defamation. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000); Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001). See infra Part III.C.1. 
 127. California, New Jersey, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania require a 
plaintiff to plead a prima facie claim before they will enforce a subpoena ordering the disclosure 
of an Internet user’s identity. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 
1999); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F.Supp.2d 153, 164 (D. Mass. 2008).; Alvis 
Coastings, Inc. v. John Does 1-10, 2004 WL 2904405, at *3 (W.D.N.C. 2004); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. 
v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. App. Div. 2001); Public Relations Soc. of America, Inc. v. Road 
Runner High Speed Online, 799 N.Y.S.2d 847, 853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); 
Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 2004 WL 3768897, *7 (Pa.D. & C. 2004). See infra Part 
III.C.2. 
 128. Delaware, Arizona, Nevada, New York, and Washington, D.C. require that plaintiff 
support his claim with enough evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment. Solers, Inc. v. 
Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 945 (2009); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Doe v. 
Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005); Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566 
F.Supp.2d 1205, 1216 (D. Nev. 2008). See infra Part III.C.3. 
 129. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000). 
 130. Id. 
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(1) [T]he court is satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied 
to th[e] court; (2) [] the party requesting subpoena has a 
‘legitimate, good faith basis’ to contend that it may be the victim 
of [actionable] conduct . . .; and (3) the subpoenaed identity 
information is centrally needed to advance th[e] claim.131  
 
In applying this test, the court found that there is a compelling state 
interest in protecting plaintiffs from the “potentially severe consequences 
that could easily flow from actionable communications on the information 
superhighway,” that significantly outweighs a limited intrusion on the First 
Amendment rights of any innocent Internet forum participants.132  The 
court, therefore, ordered AOL to reveal the identity of five anonymous 
Internet forum participants who posted various defamatory material 
misrepresentations about the plaintiff.133 In so ordering, the court found that 
based on a reading of the chat room postings,134 there was a good faith 
basis for the plaintiff’s allegations, and the identity of the defendants was 
needed to pursue those allegations.135 
2.  Motion to Dismiss Standard 
Some states require that the plaintiff “establish to the Court’s satisfaction 
that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion to 
dismiss.”136 In Seescandy.com.,137 the United States District Court for the 
 
 131. Id. In AOL, Plaintiff Anonymous Publicly Traded Company (“APTC”) sought to discover 
the identities of five anonymous AOL users who had posted allegedly defamatory material 
misrepresentations to Internet chat rooms under pseudonyms. Id. Seeking to protect the anonymity 
of its subscribers, AOL refused to comply with the discovery request and filed a motion to quash 
the subpoena. Id. In ruling on AOL’s motion, the Virginia Circuit Court applied the three-part test 
set forth above, and denied AOL’s motion to quash. Id. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. 
 134. The Complaint did not set forth or describe the content of any of the allegedly tortuous 
messages, did not state where on the Internet the referenced “Chat Rooms” were located, and did 
not identify any of the screen names under which the messages were supposedly posted. See Brief 
of Appellant at *7, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 2000 WL 34613057 at 
*7 (Va. 2000) (No. 000974) (referencing the contents of the complaint). 
 135. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000). 
 136. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D.Cal. 1999). To survive a 
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need not produce enough evidence to win at trial, but he must put 
forth enough evidence to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980). In considering a 
motion to dismiss, the general rule is that a complaint should not be dismissed on the pleadings 
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).  
 137. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 573. 
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Northern District of California developed its test for balancing the 
competing interests between a plaintiff and an anonymous defendant.138 In 
Seescandy.com, the court found four criteria that when met, “will ensure 
that this unusual procedure will only be employed in cases where the 
plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a 
civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent use of this method to harass or 
intimidate.”139 The Seescandy.com test requires that a plaintiff: (1) identify 
the missing party with enough specificity so that the Court can determine 
that the defendant is a real person or entity who is subject to personal 
jurisdiction;140 (2) identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive 
defendant;141 (3) establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit 
against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss;142 and (4) file a 
discovery request with the Court.143 The Seescandy.com court found that 
the plaintiff had demonstrated enough evidence that its trademark 
infringement claim could survive a motion to dismiss.144 Specifically, the 
court found that plaintiff had satisfied the test for infringement of a 
federally registered trademark because they had shown in their complaint145 
that the allegedly infringing act “creates a likelihood of confusion.”146  
 
 138. Id. at 578–80. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 578–79. The court found that plaintiff’s complaint had properly identified the 
missing party with enough specificity to satisfy this first requirement. Id. 
 141. Id. at 579. The court found that plaintiff had satisfied this element by calling the two non-
directory information services telephone numbers listed on the seescandy.com website and serving 
all relevant pre-trial documents to the e-mail addresses associated with the domains registered by 
the people who registered seescandy.com. Id. 
 142. Id. at 579–80. The court found that plaintiff satisfied this element by satisfying the test for 
infringement of a federally registered trademark for false designation of origin under the Lanham 
Act. Id. 
 143. Id. at 580. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, Complaint, 1999 WL 34760595.  
Paragraph 28 avers, 
On information and belief, COLUMBIA and SEE'S CANDY aver that Defendants 
adopted and use the identical SEE'S MARKS and the virtually identical 
SEESCANDY.COM and SEESCANDYS.COM Internet addresses with full knowledge 
of Plaintiff's SEE'S MARKS for the purpose and with the intent to cause confusion 
among the purchasing public and to deceive and mislead the purchasing public. 
 Id. at ¶ 28.  
Paragraph 33 avers, “Defendants' use of the identical SEE'S MARKS and the virtually identical 
SEESCANDY.COM and SEESCANDYS.COM Internet address constitutes a direct imitation of 
Plaintiff's SEE'S MARKS, and the use thereof in connection with Defendants' sale of candy is 
likely to cause further confusion of and deception among the purchasing public.” Id. at ¶ 33. 
 146. Seescandy, 185 F.R.D. at 580. 
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Specifically, the court cited to emails from confused consumers147 and 
defendants’ desire to sell the domain names back to See’s Candy,148 as 
evidence that defendants intentionally infringed on plaintiff’s trademark.149  
Based on this finding, and the satisfaction of the other elements of its test, 
the court granted plaintiff’s discovery request to identify the anonymous 
defendant.150 
3.  Prima Facie Case / Summary Judgment Standard 
States that require a prima facie showing/summary judgment proof require 
that “to obtain discovery of an anonymous defendant’s identity . . . a 
defamation plaintiff ‘must submit sufficient evidence to establish a prima 
facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.’”151 In order 
to prove a prima facie case for defamation, the plaintiff must introduce 
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for each essential 
element.152  
Some jurisdictions use a balancing test in conjunction with this prima 
facie standard.153 In Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe,154 the New Jersey 
Superior Court Appellate Division used the summary judgment test as part 
of a four part test when considering how to balance the competing interests 
between a defamation plaintiff and an anonymous defendant.155 The 
Dendrite test requires plaintiffs to: (1) undertake an effort to notify the 
anonymous poster, including posting notice to the message board where the 
alleged defamation occurred, and withhold action to afford the anonymous 
an opportunity to respond to the claim; (2) set forth the exact statements 
that are alleged to be defamatory; (3) satisfy the prima facie or summary 
judgment standard; and (4) after the first three criteria are satisfied, the 
court must “balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous 
free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the 
 
 147. Id. At hearing, Plaintiff produced 31 emails that Defendant had received from consumers 
seeking to purchase See’s Candy from defendant’s website. Id. 
 148. Id. The court found that Defendants desire to sell the two domains back to See's Candy 
combined with the use of See's trademark logos, was a sign that defendants intended to trade on 
the goodwill associated with the See's marks.  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 463 (Del. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
 152. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 772 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 153. Id. 
 154. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 155. Id. at 760–61. 
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necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to allow 
the plaintiff to properly proceed.”156   
The Dendrite Court applied this test when examining the appropriate 
procedures to be followed and the standards to be applied by New Jersey 
courts in evaluating subpoenas to discover of the identity of anonymous 
users of ISP message boards.157 In Dendrite, the plaintiff Corporation 
served an ISP with a subpoena demanding the discovery of the identity of 
anonymous individuals who had allegedly defamed the plaintiff.158 The 
court applied its four-part test and found that the plaintiff fell short of the 
summary judgment standard the test requires because plaintiff failed to 
establish the harm that was caused by the alleged defamation.159 In so 
finding, the court noted that Dendrite had met the motion to dismiss 
standard for defamation,160 but held that Dendrite had failed the summary 
judgment standard because they failed to show harm.161 Thus, the Dendrite 
court did not reach the balancing component of their four-part test.162 
Other jurisdictions have applied the Dendrite test without the 
balancing test.163 In Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the 
summary judgment test is itself the balancing test, and that the fourth 
requirement of the Dendrite test adds no protection above and beyond the 
 
 156. Id. To prove a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove enough evidence that he would 
prevail in a motion for summary judgment if his motion was unopposed. Cahill, at 464. 
 157. Dendrite Int’l , Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
 158. Id. at 760. 
 159. Id. at 760, 770–72. Specifically, the court found that Dendrite had not established that the 
fluctuations in its stock prices were the direct result of Defendant’s postings. Id. at 772.  
On three of the days that immediately followed a posting by John Doe No. 3, 
Dendrite's stock value decreased. However, on five of the days that immediately 
followed a posting by John Doe No. 3, Dendrite's stock value increased. The net 
change in Dendrite's stock value over those seven days was actually an increase of 
3 and 5/8 points. 
 Id. 
 160. Id.  
Here, Dendrite has (1) identified the ‘revenue recognition’ and ‘shopping’ statements as 
purportedly defamatory words, (2) identified ‘xxplrr’ (John Doe No. 3) as the utterer, 
and (3) established that they were in fact published on Yahoo!’s bulletin board. 
Accordingly, Dendrite meets the bare minimum requirements for a defamation cause of 
action, and would survive a motion to dismiss under the traditional application of R. 
4:6-2(e). 
Id.   
 161. Id. at 772. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Doe v. Cahill, 844 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Maxon v. Ottawa Pub. Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 
676 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
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first three requirements.164 The Cahill court also found that the extra 
balancing test at the end of the Dendrite test needlessly complicated the 
analysis.165 Indeed, once the Dendrite court found that plaintiff’s claim 
failed the summary judgment prong of its test, the court stopped its analysis 
and did not apply the balancing test.166 Similarly, the Illinois Appellate 
Court found that the balancing test between a First Amendment right and a 
statutory right really isn’t a balancing test because the scales necessarily tip 
toward the First Amendment right.167  
IV. The Court’s Reasoning 
In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,168 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s 
County and held that the circuit court had abused its discretion when 
ordering the identification of the five John Does because Brodie failed to 
plead a valid cause of action against any defendant.169 Writing for the 
majority, Judge Battaglia determined that the trial judge had dismissed the 
cause of action against the three John Doe Defendants, and the one year 
statute of limitations barred plaintiff from bringing any action in defamation 
against the two Unnamed Offenders who posted defamatory statements 
about the unsanitary conditions of plaintiff’s restaurant.170 The Court of 
Appeals, therefore, held that because plaintiff’s only possible cause of 
action was barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court abused its 
discretion when it ordered Independent Newspapers to identify the five 
John Does.171 
 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 772. 
 167. Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 676 (“[O]nce the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for 
defamation, the potential defendant has no first-amendment right to balance against the petitioner's 
right to seek redress for damage to his reputation, as it is well settled that there is no first-
amendment right to defame.”). 
 168. 966 A.2d 432 (2009). 
 169. Id. at 447. 
 170. Id. at 449 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-105 (2002) (“An action for 
assault, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues.”)). 
 171. Id. at 447–48.  
[T]he abuse of discretion standard [provides that] the trial court abused its discretion 
where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court [ ] . . . or 
when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles, and the ruling under 
consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the 
court[ ] . . . or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic. 
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After quickly disposing of the circuit court’s ruling below, Judge 
Battaglia used the Brodie case to guide Maryland’s lower courts and 
establish the standard to apply when balancing an individual’s First 
Amendment right to speak anonymously on the Internet against a plaintiff’s 
right to seek judicial redress for defamation.172 Judge Battaglia recognized 
that the well settled First Amendment right to speak anonymously173 
applies to the Internet with equal force.174 However, the court recognized 
that this right is limited by defamation considerations, and a defendant’s 
right to free speech on the Internet and must be balanced against a 
plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation.175 Seeking to find a test that would 
appropriately balance these competing interests, the court analyzed tests 
applied by other state courts in similar situations.176  The Court found that 
the “good faith basis” test used by the Virginia Circuit Court in In re 
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.,177 would inhibit the use of 
the Internet as a marketplace of ideas, whereas the summary judgment 
standard used by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Cahill, would 
“undermine personal accountability and the search for truth, by requiring 
claimants to essentially prove their case before knowing who the 
commentator was.”178  
 
 Id. (citing Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 878 A.2d 567, 583–84 
(Md. 2005)). 
 172. Id. at 447. 
 173. Id. at 440–41. Both the Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have 
recognized that the First Amendment protects the right of an individual to speak anonymously. Id. 
(citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“[A]n author’s 
decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment.”) (citing Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 882 A.2d 833, 846 (Md. 2005) (finding that the 
anonymity of a subscriber to a publication is protected under the First Amendment.)). 
 174. Id. at 442 “[P]rotections under the First Amendment have been extended to the Internet by 
various federal courts and courts in our sister states” (citing Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 1-
40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). 
 175. Id. at 441 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)). 
 176. Id. at 449–56. 
 177. 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000). 
 178. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 454.  
The lower ‘good faith basis’ or ‘motion to dismiss’ thresholds, articulated by our sister 
courts in AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37, and Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579, would inhibit 
the use of the Internet as a marketplace of ideas, where boundaries for participation in 
public discourse melt away, and anyone with access to a computer can speak to an 
audience ‘larger and more diverse than any [of] the Framers could have imagined. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Setting the bar too high, on the other hand, to require plaintiffs to meet a summary 
judgment standard, “that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” would undermine personal accountability 
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Recognizing that setting too low a threshold would limit free speech 
on the Internet, and that setting too high a standard could prohibit a plaintiff 
from bring a valid (but not bulletproof) cause of action for defamation, the 
court sought a middle ground in a five-part test.179 Judge Battaglia’s five-
part test for issuing a subpoena revealing an Internet poster’s identity, 
which combined features of the Dendrite180 and Cahill181 tests, provides: 
 
[W]hen a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in 
which anonymous speakers or pseudonyms are involved, it 
should, (1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the 
anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or 
application for an order of disclosure, including posting a 
message of notification of the identity discovery request on the 
message board; (2) withhold action to afford the anonymous 
posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to 
the application; (3) require the plaintiff to identify and set forth 
the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous 
poster, alleged to constitute actionable speech; (4) determine 
whether the complaint has set forth a prima facie defamation per 
se or per quod action against the anonymous posters; and (5), if 
all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous poster’s First 
Amendment right to free speech against the strength of the prima 
facie case of defamation presented by the plaintiff and the 
necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity, 
prior to ordering disclosure.182 
 
Judge Adkins wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the holding of 
the case and the first four elements of Judge Battaglia’s five-part test, but 
disagreeing with the majority’s inclusion of the fifth element balancing 
test.183 Arguing that defamation occurs more frequently and more visibly 
on the Internet than via more traditional mediums, Judge Adkins disagreed 
with the majority’s balancing test as “unnecessary and needlessly 
complicated.”184  Judge Adkins reasoned that the prima facie case element 
 
and the search for truth, by requiring claimants to essentially prove their case before 
even knowing who the commentator was. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). 
 181. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461. 
 182. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (emphasis in original).  
 183. Id. at 457–59 (Adkins, J., concurring).  
 184. Id. at 458. 
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of the majority’s test is itself a “balancing test,” and there is no need for an 
additional balancing test.185 Judge Adkins concluded that the fifth-element 
balancing test adopted by the majority gives a trial court the authority to 
decide that a plaintiff’s cause of action shall not go forward, even though it 
satisfies the other four elements of the Brodie test, because the court has 
decided that defendant’s interests are greater than the plaintiff’s.186 Judge 
Adkins feared that the majority’s fifth-element balancing test “invites the 
lower courts to apply, on an ad hoc basis, a ‘superlaw’ of Internet 
defamation that can trump the well-established defamation law.”187 
V. Analysis 
In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,188 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland established the standard for Maryland Courts to follow when 
balancing an individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on 
the Internet against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for 
defamation.189 In this case of first impression, the Court developed a five- 
part test consisting of: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to respond; (3) identifying 
the exact statements alleged to be defamatory; (4) prima facie proof of the 
allegations; and (5) a balancing test.190 In developing its test, the Court 
properly encouraged potential plaintiffs and defendants to resolve disputes 
within the public forum.191 The Brodie Court’s test also set the proper 
burden of proof for a plaintiff to meet before the court will enforce a 
subpoena to discover the identity of an anonymous Internet forum 
participant.192 The Brodie Court’s inclusion of a balancing component, 
however, causes its test to fall short of the Court’s stated goal of 
establishing a clear standard for the lower courts to follow.193 By subjecting 
the outcome of cases to a great deal of judicial discretion, the Brodie test 
blurs the line between defamation and legitimate discourse and if upheld 
and applied by other states, the Brodie test will hinder the development of 
 
 185. See id. (“The summary judgment test is itself the balance. The [balancing test] adds no 
protection above and beyond that of the summary judgment test and needlessly complicates the 
analysis.”) (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461. 
 186. Id. at 459. 
 187. Id. 
 188. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009). 
 189. Id. at 457. 
 190. Id. 
 191. See infra Part IV.A. 
 192. See infra Part IV.B. 
 193. See infra Part IV.C. 
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the Internet and may keep it from reaching its potential as a truly credible 
public forum.194 
A. The Brodie Test’s Notification and Withholding Requirements Properly 
Encourage Plaintiffs and Defendants to Resolve Potential Problems within 
the Public Forum 
By including notification195 and withholding196 requirements, the Brodie 
court’s test is true to the spirit of the Internet.197 Though some states do not 
require either notice or withholding,198 those tests were developed before 
the Internet became truly ingrained in the fabric of American free 
speech.199 The Court’s notification requirement obligates the plaintiff to 
post notice to the message board where the defamatory language was posted 
before the court will enforce a subpoena to discover the identity of the 
alleged defamer.200  
Requiring the plaintiff to post notice in this manner has three potential 
benefits. First, it detracts from the weight of defamatory statements.201 By 
 
 194. See infra Part IV.C. 
 195. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (“[W]hen a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in 
which anonymous speakers . . . are involved, it should, (1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts 
to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena . . . , including posting a 
message of notification of the identity discovery request on the message board.”). 
 196. Id. “[W]hen a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in which anonymous 
speakers or pseudonyms are involved, it should . . . (2) withhold action to afford the anonymous 
posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application.”). 
 197. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 198. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“Parties who have been injured by [Internet defamation] are likely to find themselves chasing the 
tortfeasor from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually 
discovering the identity of the tortfeasor.”); see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America 
Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000) (making no mention of a requirement of notice in its 
analysis). 
 199. Katy Noeth, The Never Ending Limits of §230: Extending ISP Immunity to the Sexual 
Exploitation of Children, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 765, 776–77 (2009) (“Technological advances have 
resulted in a drastically advanced cyber world from the one that existed . . . in 1996. The 
landscape and modern realities of the Internet have changed significantly. Internet sites are 
flourishing, and the Internet now serves almost 1.5 billion people. Internet usage increased 
129.6% in North America alone from 2000 until 2008, and 305.5% throughout the rest of the 
world.”). See also David Richards, Note, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case 
for Changing the Legal Regime Created by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1321, 1323 (describing the growing popularity of social networking sites like Facebook.com 
and MySpace.com). 
 200. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457. 
 201. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 (2005)  
[A] person wronged by statements of an anonymous poster can respond instantly . . . to 
the allegedly defamatory statements on the same site or blog, and thus, can, almost 
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forcing a plaintiff to respond to the defamer directly, the Brodie court is 
encouraging the type of anonymous debate that the Internet fosters.202 
Although the Internet has emerged as the most popular forum for public 
debate, it has a long way to go in reaching the level of credibility that other 
forums have.203 Many Internet forums lack credibility because of the fact 
that some of the same safeguards that exist in more conventional forms of 
media do not exist with the Internet.204 Most Internet users are tuned in to 
this truth and, therefore, read postings with a grain of salt.205 Thus, when a 
plaintiff responds directly to an allegedly defamatory statement, readers of 
the exchange may recognize the defamatory nature of the statement easier 
and be more inclined to ignore it.206 
 
contemporaneously, respond to the same audience that initially read the allegedly 
defamatory statements. The plaintiff can thereby easily correct any misstatements or 
falsehoods, respond to character attacks, and generally set the record straight.” Id. 
 202. See id. (finding that responding directly to attacks is an effective way of silencing critics); 
See also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). “Through the use of chat rooms, any person 
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from 
any soapbox.” Id.  
 203. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
Users are able to engage freely in informal debate and criticism, leading many to 
substitute gossip for accurate reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even 
combative tone. . . . [O]nline discussions may look more like a vehicle for emotional 
catharsis than a forum for rapid exchange of information and ideas. . . .”  
Id. (citing Lidsky, supra note 74, at 863); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 465 (“Blogs and chat rooms 
tend to be vehicles for the expression of opinions; by their very nature, they are not a source of 
facts or data upon which a reasonable person would rely.”). 
 204. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 466 (“[A] reasonable person reading a newspaper in print or 
online . . . can assume that the statements are factually based and researched. This is not the case 
when the statements are made on blogs or in chat rooms.”); see also Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc. 
v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Unlike . . . traditional media, there are no 
controls [for posting on the Internet].”). In order to have an editorial published in a newspaper the 
author must submit his commentary to the editors of the newspaper and those editors must choose 
to publish it. This safeguard often catches offensive material and material that is of little value, 
and adds to the credibility of the statements that do make it through the screening process. Most 
Internet forums favor direct user upload, and do not have the level of pre-approval before 
comments are posted to the forums. See How to Submit an Article to the Op-Ed Page, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 11, 2010 (describing the process of getting an article published by the New York Times Op-
Ed section), available at http://www nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/opedsubmit html.  
 205. See Global Telemedia, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 (“The reasonable reader, looking at the 
hundreds and thousands of postings [on an Internet forum] from a wide variety of posters, would 
not expect that [anyone] was airing anything other than [their own] personal views . . . .”). 
 206. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (discussing how the Internet permits users to instantly 
respond to criticisms and take the force out of defamatory statements by directly addressing those 
comments). 
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Second, the Brodie test’s requirements of notification and withholding 
protect the alleged defamer from an ex parte207 action that would 
permanently remove his anonymity.208 Once the identity of an anonymous 
person is revealed, that person can never be anonymous again.209 
Recognizing the irreversible nature of identification, the Brodie Court 
included the withholding requirement to give a defamation defendant a 
reasonable opportunity to defend against plaintiff’s allegations.210 The 
withholding requirement is essential to protect the free flowing exchange of 
ideas on the Internet, because it errs on the side of protecting anonymity.211 
Third, the Brodie test’s requirements of notification and withholding 
may prevent other people from posting defamatory statements on the 
Internet.212 The Internet has become the principle place where people 
obtain information, but it also has become a place where people come 
together to vent.213 Often times the venting of one person causes a chain 
reaction of posting that starts with legitimate concerns and devolves into 
“cyber-smear.”214 Requiring a defamation plaintiff to post notice on the 
same message board where the defamation occurred might sever the “chain 
 
 207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (9th ed. 2009) defines “ex parte” as “[o]n or from one 
party only, usu. without notice to or argument from the adverse party.” 
 208. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (requiring the plaintiff to notify the defendant to avoid ex 
parte proceedings); see also Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. 
Wash. 2001) (finding that the “potential chilling effect imposed by the unmasking of anonymous 
speakers would diminish if litigants first were required to make a showing in court of their need 
for the identifying information.”). 
 209. See 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (finding that the First Amendment 
right to anonymity includes in its scope, the right to remain anonymous after the speech is 
concluded). 
 210. Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 456 (Md. 2009). 
 211. 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (“The free exchange of ideas on the 
Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously. If 
Internet users could be stripped of . . . anonymity by a civil subpoena . . . this would have a 
significant chilling effect in Internet communications and thus on basic First Amendment 
rights.”); see Ken Kumayama, Note, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 439 (arguing 
that if anonymity is removed from the Internet, people will resort to self-censorship and the free 
flowing exchange of ideas will stop).  
 212. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (noting that by posting notification directly to the same 
Internet forum where the allegedly defamatory statement was posted, a plaintiff can “set the 
record straight”). 
 213. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. App. 2008).  
Users are able to engage freely in informal debate and criticism, leading many to 
substitute gossip for accurate reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even 
combative tone. . . . [O]nline discussions may look more like a vehicle for emotional 
catharsis than a forum for rapid exchange of information and ideas. . . .”  
Id. (citing Lidsky, supra note 74, at 863.). 
 214. Id. 
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of venting” and discourage subsequent posters from posting borderline 
defamatory statements.215 
B. The Prima Facie Showing Standard in the Brodie Test Properly Sets a 
High Enough Yet Attainable Burden for Plaintiffs in Defamation Actions 
In developing its own test, the Brodie court analyzed the tests applied by 
other state courts in similar situations.216 The court followed a majority of 
its sister states in requiring a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of a 
claim of defamation before the court will enforce a subpoena ordering the 
discovery of the identity of the defamatory defendant.217 To establish a 
prima facie claim of defamation the plaintiff must show: “(1) that the 
defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person, (2) that the 
statement was false, (3) that the defendant was legally at fault in making the 
statement, and (4) that the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.”218 Courts that 
reject this standard as too burdensome argue that the standard requires a 
plaintiff to invest too much time into his case without any assurance that he 
will be able to recover from the defendant.219 This argument is misplaced. 
In a defamatory action, the identity of the defendant has little to no bearing 
on a plaintiff’s ability to prove a prima facie case.220  
A lower burden of proof, like the good faith basis test applied by the 
AOL Court,221 would benefit frivolous plaintiffs by giving them easy access 
to types of extra-judicial relief.222 If able to reveal the identity of their 
alleged defamer without showing more than “good faith,” plaintiffs would 
be able to expose possibly innocent people to public criticism, ostracism, 
and other things that the right to anonymity is designed to protect 
 
 215. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (by posting a direct response to the allegedly defamatory 
statement, a plaintiff may be able to limit the damage of the defamatory statement). 
 216. Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 447–57 (Md. 2009). 
 217. Id. at 456. 
 218. Offen v. Brenner, 935 A.2d 719, 723–24 (Md. 2007). 
 219. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 242–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing that 
Dendrite’s burden was too high so Cahill adopted a lower “motion for summary judgment” 
standard). 
 220. See Offen, 935 A.2d at 723–24. The identity of the defendant is not an element of the 
cause of action of defamation. See id. Logically, the identity of the defendant does not impact the 
plaintiff’s ability to recover. If he has a valid cause of action, he will be able to recover. If he does 
not have a valid cause of action, then he will not be able to recover no matter who the defendant 
is. See id. 
 221. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000). 
 222. See Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005) (“In our view, this ‘good faith’ standard is too 
easily satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant’s right to speak anonymously.”). 
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against.223 Even the burden that requires a showing sufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss is too low, because Maryland is a notice pleading 
state.224 In a notice pleading state, any allegation that puts the opposing 
party on notice of the claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, 
even if the allegation is “vague or lacking in detail.”225 This means that a 
plaintiff doesn’t have to prove anything before exposing the defendant’s 
identity.226 Rather, he would have the ability to expose the identity of an 
alleged defamer as long as the plaintiff simply puts the defendant on notice 
that he is being sued.227 In this scenario, a plaintiff could file suit against an 
anonymous defendant, expose the defendant’s identity, and abuse the 
lenient standard.228 Having a burden lower than prima facie proof of 
plaintiff’s case would result in a level of extra-judicial relief incompatible 
with the First Amendment right to anonymity.229  
C. The Fifth Element of the Brodie Test Erases the Stability of the Test and 
Provides Maryland with the Least Clear Standard of Any State by 
Ultimately Deferring to the Discretion of the Trial Judge 
The clarity provided by the Brodie Court’s first four elements of its test is 
completely destroyed by its fifth element.230 By adding a balancing element 
to the tail end of the test, the Brodie decision has the potential to cause 
more problems than it solves.231 First, the balancing test allows a judge to 
override the written law because it grants the trial court discretion to refuse 
to order the disclosure of the identity of the defendant only after the 
plaintiff has proven his prima facie cause of action.232 If the plaintiff fails 
 
 223. See supra, note 125 and accompanying text. 
 224. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458 (“[E]ven the more stringent motion to dismiss standard, the 
middle option in the spectrum of standards from which we may choose, falls short of providing 
sufficient protection to a defendant’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously.”); MD. CODE 
ANN., RULES §2-303(b) (West 2009) (“Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and 
direct. No technical forms of pleadings are required.”). 
 225. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 242–43. 
 229. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 770 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(finding that a motion to dismiss standard fails to provide a basis for an analysis and balancing of 
plaintiff’s request for disclosure in light of defendant’s competing right of anonymity and free 
speech).   
 230. Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 459 (Md. 2009) (Adkins, J., 
concurring). 
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. at 456 (majority opinion) (“if all else is satisfied, balance . .  .”) (emphasis added); 
see also Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (Barker, J., dissenting) (“I 
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to prove a prima facie cause of action, then there is no need for the court to 
apply the balancing test.233 Essentially, the balancing test gives the court 
the power to refuse to grant plaintiff a remedy even where plaintiff has 
already proven his valid cause of action.234 This balancing test is contrary 
to the established law and invites the trial courts to impose what one judge 
referred to as a “superlaw” that trumps the well established defamation 
law.235  
At its worst, the balancing test gives too much discretion to trial judges 
and allows them to rule on a case without explaining why they reached their 
decisions.236 The balancing test creates the potential for judges to abuse 
their discretion and create inconsistent law that strays greatly from the 
intended outcome of the Brodie decision of providing “guidance to the trial 
courts.”237 The balancing test affords the Maryland circuit courts a level of 
discretion238 that spawns unpredictability. This discretion allows the trial 
courts to disregard the established law and essentially determine the 
outcome of cases by ignoring the first four elements of the Brodie test and 
using its sole discretion.239 The Brodie Court should have established a 
bright-line rule because a bright-line rule would more fully comport with 
the Brodie decision’s stated goal of “guidance to the trial courts.”240 
A recent unpublished decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey 
illustrates how having a balancing test in this area of law may lead to 
judicial confusion and inconsistent results.241 In Zubowski v. Doe,242 the 
New Jersey trial court applied the Dendrite test to determine whether or not 
to quash various subpoenas seeking to discover the identity of an 
anonymous individual accused of defaming the plaintiff Alexandra 
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Zubowski.243 The trial court judge found that the first three elements of the 
Dendrite test were met, and most importantly, found that the plaintiff had 
proven her case on a prima facie basis.244 Even though the court found that 
the plaintiff had proven a prima facie case of defamation, the court granted 
the defendant’s motion and quashed the subpoena.245 This result was made 
possible by the use of a balancing test.246 The court balanced the strengths 
of plaintiff’s claim of defamation against the defendant’s First Amendment 
rights and found that the First Amendment rights outweighed the plaintiff’s 
claim for defamation.247 In Zubowski, the court granted the motion to quash 
even though the plaintiff had satisfied the most rigorous standard that courts 
employ in these types of cases.248 The court’s opinion demonstrates that 
when even when a plaintiff has proven a prima facie case of defamation he 
may not be granted the chance to proceed to a case on the merits because of 
this balancing test.249  
A second problem with the balancing element of the Brodie test is that 
the balancing portion of the test is essentially immune from appeal.250 In 
other instances where the Maryland Court of Appeals has laid down 
elements and told the trial court to apply a balancing test, the Court will not 
reverse the discretion of a trial court judge as long as he has followed the 
non-balancing elements of the test.251 With much more difficult appeals, a 
class of plaintiffs with valid claims may be barred from recovering damages 
caused by defamatory statements. If there was no balancing element, the 
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standard of review for an order enforcing a subpoena to discover the 
identity of an anonymous Internet forum participant would be de novo.252  
A third problem with the balancing element is that it may encourage 
defamation on the Internet.  The balancing element of the Brodie test only 
comes into play when a plaintiff has already proven a prima facie case of 
defamation.253 This allows circuit court judges the discretion to dismiss a 
case where the plaintiff has prima facie proven defamation, but the 
balancing element of the Brodie test does not matter if the plaintiff falls 
short of proving a prima facie case.254 Furthermore, the balancing test 
attempts to balance two lopsided interests.255 The balancing test pits a 
Constitutional right against a statutory right and necessarily leans towards 
the interest in protecting a defendant’s right to anonymity even where the 
plaintiff has proven their right to recovery.256 Therefore, if Maryland keeps 
this balancing element, the Court will necessarily lean to the side of 
protecting anonymity.257 If the Court continues to lean to the side of 
protecting anonymity, then people may become more cavalier in what they 
decide to post on the Internet and the Internet may devolve into a haven for 
defamation. 
Maryland should eliminate the balancing element from the Brodie test 
because it is counterproductive to the clarity of the first four elements of its 
test. The Internet is beginning to replace many other forms of 
communication, and if it isn’t already, it is poised for total immersion into 
every facet of American life.258 The Internet has the potential to be the most 
efficient, credible, and widespread medium for the exercise of free speech 
in the world because of what it offers in terms of anonymity, accessibility 
and speed.259 For the Internet to ever realize that potential, however, the 
 
 252. See id. A de novo standard of review is preferred to an abuse of discretion standard, 
because de novo review gives the appellate court the opportunity to reexamine the facts of the 
case, and make a ruling independent of the trial court’s finding of facts. See Gray v. State, 879 
A.2d 1064, 1068 (Md. 2005) (“When the trial court’s order involves an interpretation and 
application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower 
court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 253. See Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2008) (majority 
opinion). 
 254. Id. 
 255. See, Maxon v. Ottawa Pub. Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (noting that the 
balancing test attempts to balance a Constitutional right with a statutory right). 
 256. Id.  
 257. See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 459 (Md. 2009) (Adkins, J., concurring). 
 258. See supra Part III.B.1.  
 259. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (discussing the reach of the Internet: “A 
person in Alaska can have a conversation with a person in Japan about beekeeping in Bangladesh, 
      
B D 
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011 229 
abuse of anonymity needs to be curtailed.260 In order to curtail the abuse of 
anonymity on the Internet, Maryland needs to apply a bright line rule that 
does not leave any room for judicial discretion.261 If Maryland applies a 
bright line rule (like the one found in the first four elements of the Brodie 
test), then individuals will know when they have crossed that line, and those 
that cross the line will be punished.262 The balancing element of the Brodie 
test blurs the line between defamation and non-defamation and creates an 
inefficient and unworkable standard, which will only lead to confusion.263   
VI. Conclusion 
In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 264 the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland established the standard for Maryland Courts to follow to balance 
an individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on the 
Internet against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for defamation.  In 
this case of first impression, the Court developed a five-part test consisting 
of: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to respond; (3) identifying the exact 
statements alleged to be defamatory; (4) prima facie proof of the 
allegations; and (5) a balancing test.265 While the first four elements of the 
Brodie court’s test provide much direction,266 the inclusion of a balancing 
component, causes the Brodie test to fall short of its goal of establishing a 
clear standard for Maryland’s trial courts to apply.267 The Brodie test’s 
balancing element creates a danger unique to Internet defamation that gives 
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too much discretion to trial judges and if upheld and applied by other states, 
the Brodie test will hinder the development of the Internet and keep it from 
reaching its potential as a truly credible public forum.268  
 
 
 268. See supra Part IV.C. 
